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Corporations
Diane S. Kaplan*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Illinois Appellate Court rendered over thirty opinions on

corporate and securities topics during the 1987-1988 survey year.
Issues addressed included long arm jurisdiction, fiduciary duties,
attorneys fees, standing, contract interpretation, dissolution and securities regulation. This article reviews significant cases selected from

among these topics.
II.

LONG ARM JURISDICTION

The first district relied on the transaction of business and tortious
act sections of the Illinois long arm statute' to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a Japanese manufacturer in Wyles v. Morita Iron
Works Co. 2 and to decline personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
corporation in Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America v. Mobil
Rocky Mountain, Inc.3
In Wyles v. Morita Iron Works Co. 4 , the Japanese defendant,
Morita, designed and manufactured in Japan four forced air cell
machines which were sold in Japan to plaintiff's employer, Astro
Packaging Company.' Astro subsequently sent two of these machines
to its Illinois plant where one machine allegedly caused plaintiff's

*

Associate Professor, The John Marshall Law School, B.A. University of California

at Berkeley, 1971; J.D. Yale Law School, 1975. The author wishes to express gratitude to The
John Marshall Law School, The John Marshall Law School Faculty Secretarial staff, and
research assistant Paul Anderson.
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
2-209 (a) (I) and (2) (1985):
Act submitting to jurisdiction-Process. (a) Any person, whether or not a citizen or
resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts
hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such person, and, if an individual, his or
her personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any
cause of action arising from the doing of any of such acts:
(1) The transaction of any business within this State;
(2) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
2. 152 II. App. 3d 782, 504 N.E.2d 942 (1st Dist. 1987).
3. 155 I1. App. 3d 841, 508 N.E.2d 211 (1st Dist. 1987).
4. 152 11. App. 3d 782, 504 N.E.2d 942 (1st Dist. 1987).
5. Id. at 783, 504 N.E.2d at 943.
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injury. 6 Morita filed a motion to quash service for lack of personal
7
jurisdiction which was granted by the trial court. The first district
reversed, finding that Morita had failed to prove that it did not
know of the machines' intended use in Illinois.'
Illinois law requires its courts to engage in a two step analysis
when determining the propriety of exercising personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant. 9 First, the plaintiff must establish that
the defendant engaged in one of the acts enumerated in the long
arm statute.' 0 Second, the plaintiff must convince the court that the
exercise of long arm jurisdiction is consistent with due process as
defined by prevailing constitutional standards." In response to the
first level of inquiry, the court found that Morita had transacted
business in Illinois because its president had failed to deny knowledge
of the machine's ultimate use in Illinois.'" For example, the president's
affidavit stated that two machines were purchased in Japan by the
plaintiff who then transported the machines to Illinois.' 3 Although
this statement was not countered by the plaintiff, the court rejected
its averments because they were not substantiated by "shipping
documents, delivery receipts, and other data which would support
the conclusion that the sale and delivery of the machines was consummated in Japan.' ' 4 The court found, instead, that the ultimate
use of the machines in Illinois was neither fortuitous nor unanticipated and, thus, the exercise of jurisdiction over Morita did not
offend due process, especially since Morita had derived economic
benefit from the transaction."
The court's transaction of business analysis is flawed in many
respects. Neither party contended, nor did the court find, that Morita
had been physically present in Illinois or had engaged in either a
course of dealing or a course of performance in Illinois. Rather,
applying a Gray v. American Radiator 6-style analysis, the court

6. Id.
7. Id. at 783-84, 504 N.E.2d at 944.
8. Id. at 785, 504 N.E.2d at 944.
2d 431, 427 N.E.2d 1203 (1981).
9. Green v. Advance-Ross Elec. Corp., 86 I11.
App. 3d at 785-86, 504 N.E.2d at 944.
10. Wyles, 152 111.
11. Id. at 786, 504 N.E.2d at 945.
12. Id. at 784-85, 504 N.E.2d at 944.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 785, 504 N.E.2d at 944.
15. Id. at 787, 504 N.E.2d at 945.
16. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961).
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inferred Morita's knowledge of the machines' ultimate use in Illinois
from a silent record which neither confirmed nor denied such inference, and concluded therefrom that Morita had transacted business
in Illinois. 7 The court also failed to demonstrate how Morita's
inferred knowledge that its machines were intended for ultimate use
in Illinois constituted its "own purposeful conduct""8 or 'substantial
connection' with the forum State" 1 9 as required by Supreme Court
case law since InternationalShoe v. Washington.20
It is not without significance that this same approach was rejected
in the recent Supreme Court case of Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd.
v. Superior Court of California,2' which was pending concurrently
with Wyles but is nowhere cited therein. Like Wyles, Asahi involved
the question of the propriety of exercising personal jurisdiction over
a Japanese component parts manufacturer whose products allegedly
22
caused injury in this country.

Asahi manufactured tire valve assemblies in Japan which were
sold to another Japanese company for assembly in Japan and eventual
distribution throughout the world. 23 Affidavits indicated Asahi's
knowledge that some of its products would be used in California.14
In 1979, a product liability suit was brought in California arising
from a motorcycle accident allegedly caused by defects in the tire.25
The tire manufacturer cross-claimed seeking indemnification from
Asahi.2 6 Although the primary suit was settled, the California Supreme Court refused to quash service of summons on Asahi, the
third party defendants. The court reasoned that by placing its products in the stream of commerce with the awareness that some products
would be used in California, Asahi had engaged in sufficient purposeful activity to satisfy due process. 27 The United States Supreme
Court reversed, finding that mere awareness or knowledge of the
ultimate destination of the product, without activity deliberately

17. Wyles, 152 I1. App. 3d
786-90, 504 N.E.2d at 945.
18. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
19. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (quoting McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)).
20. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
21. 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
22. Id. at 1027.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1030.
25. Id. at 1029.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1030.

HeinOnline -- 12 S. Ill. U. L.J. 811 1987-1988

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 12

directed toward the target's locale, did not constitute purposeful
conduct sufficient to satisfy due process. 28 Applying the Asahi rationale to the Morita case, if record proof of knowledge does not
provide a constitutional basis for personal jurisdiction then it is
difficult to conceive how mere inferences of awareness can constitute
a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction.
Second, Worldwide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson2 9 specifically
excluded from the concept of purposeful conduct the unilateral acts
of the plaintiff over which the defendant had no control. Just as the
location of the trustee was found to be a "fortuitous" act beyond
the control of the defendant trust company in McGee v. International
Life Insurance Co.,30 so are the location of Astro's plant in Illinois
and Astro's shipping of the machines from Japan to Illinois unilateral
acts of the plaintiff beyond the defendant's control-even if the
defendant had knowledge of such acts.
Furthermore, the opinion fails to specify any act of the defendant
having constitutional significance. There was no dispute that the
entire transaction which was the subject of the motion to quash
occurred outside of Illinois. 3 The negotiations for, and design, manufacture and delivery of the product all occurred outside of Illinois.32
In fact, the only Illinois contact which the court could point to was
the allegation that the transaction had "consequences" in Illinois.3"
"Consequences," without more, do not rise to the level of "substantial connection with" 3 or "conduct expressly aimed at" 3 the
forum as required by recent Supreme Court rulings.
Third, the transaction of business section of the opinion is laced
with derogatory comments about "[t]he influx of foreign products
to our shores and the dominance of some of our major markets by
foreign enterprises." 3 6 The court relied on such transnational economic concerns as the basis for Illinois' "'manifest interest' in
providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries

28. Id. at 1033.
29. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
30. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
31.
Wyles, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 787, 504 N.E.2d at 945.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 789, 504 N.E.2d at 947.
34. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1033.
35. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
36. Wyles, 152 I11.App. 3d at 786, 504 N.E.2d at 945 (citing State of the Union Address
by President Reagan of January 27, 1987).
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inflicted by out-of-State actors."" Such statements create the erroneous impression that Illinois is hostile to the presence of foreign
commerce within its borders. More importantly, such statements fly
in the face of policy concerns set forth in Asahi which forewarned
of economic balkanization resulting from the over-extension of 'our
notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field' 38 :
The possibility of being haled into a California court as a result of
an accident involving Asahi's components undoubtedly creates an
additional deterrent to the manufacturer of unsafe components;
however, similar pressures will be placed on Asahi by the purchasers
of its components as long as those who use Asahi components in
their final products, and sell those products to California, are subject
to the application of California tort law.3 9
The court further admonished the states that over-reaching long arm
statutes may be particularly unreasonable on an international basis
given "[t]he unique burdens placed upon one who must defend
' 40
oneself in a foreign legal system."
In the second section of the opinion, that court found that
Morita had commmitted "a tortious act within this State' ' 4 because
the injury had been felt there. 42 This "last act" analysis is questionable
in light of such cases as Hanson v. Denckla43 and Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine" which specifically repudiated the application of conflicts
doctrine to personal jurisdiction questions.
In sum, Illinois' exercise of personal jurisdiction under paragraphs 2-209(a)(1) and (2), based on inferred, rather than record
knowledge, and the occurrence of an injury felt within the state, without
more, constituted an unconstitutional over-extension of its long arm
jurisdiction contravening constitutional standards as set forth from
InternationalShoe Co. 41 to Asahi."
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Mobil Rocky Mountain,
Inc. 47 addressed the question of whether Illinois could exercise long
37.

Id. at 789, 504 N.E.2d at 947.

38.

Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1035 (quoting United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S.

378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

45.
46.
47.

Id. at 1034.
Id.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, 1 2-209(a)(2) (1985).
Wyles, 152 111.App. 3d at 790, 504 N.E.2d at 947.
724 F.2d 235, 254 (1958).
465 U.S. 770 (1984). But see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Asahi Metal Ind. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
155 I11.App. 3d 841, 508 N.E.2d 211 (1st Dist. 1987).
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arm jurisdiction over the assignee of a contract involving no contacts
in Illinois except that the plaintiff was a subsidiary of an Illinois
corporation. The facts giving rise to the case involved a natural-gas
purchase contract between Anschutz, a corporation of unspecified
origin and Natural Gas Pipeline Co., a Delaware corporation which48
was also a wholly owned subsidiary. of an Illinois corporation.
Anschutz had partially assigned the contract to Mobil Rocky Mountain, Inc., a Delaware corporation. 49 When market conditions changed
and the price of natural gas dropped below the contract price, Natural
Gas brought a declaratory judgment action against Mobil challenging
the quantity term of the contract.5 0 Mobil filed a motion to quash
service- of process on the grounds that it had not committed an act
submitting it to Illinois' personal jurisdiction. In a confused opinion,
the circuit court granted Mobil's motion, finding .that it had not
transacted business in Illinois as required.by the long arm statute52
even though the contract allegedly had "substantial economic impact
on the commerce in Illinois"" and, therefore, satisfied the due process
4
requirements of the Constitution.
Natural Gas appealed the long arm finding and Mobil appealed
the .due process finding. Natural Gas argued that Mobil was subject
to Illinois' general jurisdiction because it indirectly exploited the
Illinois market thus satisfying the "doing business" test of Connelly
v. Uniroyal, Inc." The court rejected as unprecedented the extension
56
of Connelly, a products liability case, to the instant contract action.
The court also rejected the plaintiff's reliance on Connelly, a specific
jurisdiction case, as precedent for the exercise of general jurisdiction
over Mobil." The difference between the two theories, the court
explained, was that specific jurisdiction required a relationship between the facts giving rise to jurisdiction and the facts giving rise to
the cause of action whereas general jurisdiction did not require such
a relationship. 8 Analyzing Mobil's one forum-related activity--deliv-

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
N.E.2d
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 842, 508 N.E.2d at 211-12.
Id.at 842, 508 N.E.2d at 212..
Id.
Id.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110,
2-209(a)(1) (1985).
Natural Gas, 155 I11.
App. 3d at 842-43, 508 N.E.2d at 212.
Id. at 843, 508 N.E.2d at 212.
Id. at 844, 508 N.E.2d at 213 (citing Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 75 111.2d 393, 389
155 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1060 (1980)).
Id.
Id. at 844-45, 508 N.E.2d at 213.
Id.
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ering gas outside of Illinois to a subsidiary of an Illinois corporation-the- court found neither specific nor general jurisdiction, and
thus, rejected the lower court's holding that Mobile had transacted
business in Illinois.5 9
The court also rejected Natural Gas's argument that the MobilNatural Gas contract constituted either a course of dealing or a
course of performance in Illinois in satisfaction of the transacting
business provision of the long arm statute. 6° The court rejected the
course of dealing argument because Natural Gas never dealt directly
with Mobil in Illinois., Rather, Mobil was an assignee of the contract
that was negotiated and executed by Anschutz. 61 The court rejected
the course of performance argument because the contract was per62
formed entirely outside of Illinois.
Finally, the court declined to address Mobil's due process arguments. As the court explained, Illinois may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only when both the long
arm and constitutional tests have been met. Mobil's failure to meet
the'long arm test rendered further analysis of the constitutional issues
unnecessary. 63 Accordingly, although the appellate court rejected the
circuit court's analysis, it agreed with its holding and thus, affirmed
its judgment. 64
III.

FIDUCIARY DUTIES

The breach of. the fiduciary duty of loyalty was addressed in
two separate cases. In Lindenhurst Drugs, Inc. v. Becker6 5 the court
found an egregious breach resulting in the usurpation of a corporate
opportunity. In Bio-Scientific Clinical Laboratory, Inc. v. Todd 6 the
court found a cognizable breach but affirmed its dismissal because
it was framed as an individual rather than as a derivative action.
.The case of Lindenhurst Drugs, Inc. v. Becker67 clearly set forth
Illinois's version of the usurpation of a corporate opportunity doctrine. Defendant Allen Becker, while still a shareholder, director and

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 845, 508 N.E.2d at 213.
Id. at 845-46, 508 N.E.2d at 214.
Id. at 846, 508 N.E.2d at 214.
Id.
Id. at 847, 508 N.E.2d at 215.
Id.
154 I11.
App. 3d 61, 506 N.E.2d 695 (2d Dist. 1987).
149 111.App. 3d 845, 501 N.E.2d 192 (1st Dist. 1986).
154 I11.
App. 3d 61, 506 N.E.2d 645 (2d Dist. 1987).
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general manager of plaintiff Lindenhurst Drugs, Inc., was charged
with purchasing the franchise of a competitor that Lindenhurst was
interested in obtaining for itself.68 In 1971, Lindenhurst entered into
a leasing arrangement with the Linden Plaza Shopping Center which
gave Lindenhurst the exclusive right to operate a pharmacy in the
plaza until December 31, 1981.69 In mid 1979, a Ben Franklin
70
franchise, located in a larger space in the plaza, became available.
After considering the possibility of expanding into the larger space,
Lindenhurst's shareholders authorized Becker to explore the possibility of acquiring the franchise. 7' Based on such inquiries, Lindenhurst made an offer to purchase the franchise.7 2 The offer was
rejected as inadequate.73 Nonetheless, Lindenhurst expressed to Becker
its continuing interest in purchasing the franchise. 74 In June of 1981,
the Plaza informed Becker that Lindenhurst's lease would not be
renewed after its expiration in December of that year. 75 Becker
immediately commenced private negotiations with the Plaza which
resulted in the purchase of the franchise on his own behalf and the
76
transfer of Lindenhurst's exclusive pharmacy rights to that store.
Becker also transferred from Lindenhurst to the franchise $45,000 in
inventory and fixtures, the cash register, patient profile cards, and
several employees. 77 Becker, however, never informed Lindenhurst
that its lease would not be renewed, nor of his intention of leaving
the corporation, nor of his acquisition of the franchise. 78 Once
Lindenhurst learned of Becker's activities, it fired him and moved
to another location in the same area. 79 The second store was unsuc80
cessful and failed within six months.
Lindenhurst sued Becker for breaching his fiduciary duty of
loyalty by acquiring for himself the franchise that he had been
authorized to acquire for it.8 Becker countered that Lindenhurst's

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 62, 506 N.E.2d at
Id. at 63, 506 N.E.2d at
Id.
Id.
Id.at 64, 506 N.E.2d at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id., 506 N.E.2d at 648.
Id. at 65, 506 N.E.2d at
Id. at 64-65, 506 N.E.2d
Id. at 65, 506 N.E.2d at
Id.
Id. at 62, 506 N.E.2d at

646.
647.

647.

648.
at 647.
648.
646.
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interest in the store lapsed once its first offer was rejected .8 2 The
sole issue on appeal was whether Becker had usurped Lindenhurst's
opportunity to acquire the franchise.83
The court defined a corporate opportunity as one in which "a
proposed activity is reasonably incident to the corporation's present
or prospective business and ... [in] which the corporation has the
capacity to engage." '8 4 The court distinguished business opportunities

that were freely available to corporate fiduciaries from corporate
opportunities the taking of which resulted in a breach of fiduciary
duty:
In determining whether an officer may take advantage of a business
opportunity in which a corporation is interested, courts consider
whether the corporation had an interest, actual or in expectancy,
in the opportunity and whether the acquisition thereof by the officer
would hinder or defeat plans and purposes of the corporation in
carrying on or developing the legitimate business for which it was
created. (Comedy Cottage, Inc. v. Berk (1986), 145 Ill.
App. 3d
355, 360, 495 N.E.2d 1006; Northwestern Terra Cotta Corp. v.
Wilson (1986), 74 Ill. App. 2d 38, 46, 219 N.E.2d 860.) Factors to
be weighed in making the determination include the manner in
which the offer was communicated to the officer, the good faith
of the officer, the use of corporate assets to acquire the opportunity,
the financial ability of the corporation to acquire the opportunity,
the degree of disclosure made to the corporation, the action taken
by the corporation with reference thereto, and the need or interest
of the corporation in the opportunity. (Paulman v. Kritzer (1966),
74 Ill. App. 2d 284, 294-95, 219 N.E.2d 541; aff'd (1967), 38 Ill.2d.
101, 230 N.E.2d 262).85
Based on these factors, the court found that Lindenhurst had
the interest and ability to acquire the franchise and that such acquisition was incident, if not necessary, to the continuation of Lindenhurst's business since its lease was not going to be renewed.8 6 The
court further found that Becker had breached his fiduciary duty of
loyalty to Lindenhurst by failing to make timely disclosures of
pertinent information he received as its general manager and then by

82. Id. at 66-67, 506 N.E.2d at 648-49.
83. Id. at 67, 506 N.E.2d at 649-50.
84. Id. at 67, 506 N.E.2d at 650 (citing Peterson Welding Supply Co. v. Cryogas Prods.,
Inc., 126 Ill. App. 3d 759, 764, 467 N.E.2d 1068, 1072 (1st Dist. 1984)).
85. Id. at 68, 506 N.E.2d at 650.
86. Id.
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using that information for his own benefit and to Lindenhurst's
detriment.17 Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order
for restitution of the misappropriated assets by the imposition of a
constructive trust.

8

In Bio-Scientific ClinicalLaboratory, Inc. v. ToddA9 the plaintiff
filed a complaint against its former president and director, appellant
Todd, its marketing director, John Todd, and Royal Crown Laboratories alleging that the parties had breached their fiduciary duty of
loyalty to the plaintiff by forming Royal, a competitor of Bio, while
still in Bio's employ. 90 Appellant Todd filed a counterclaim against
Bio's management, count II of which alleged breaches of fiduciary
duties owed to her as a substantial but minority shareholder. Count
II of the counterclaim charged management with causing Bio to
engage in a fraudulent scheme to perform unnecessary medical tests
on public aid patients which placed Bio in jeopardy of civil and
criminal liability and consequential loss of remunerative welfare
programs. 9'

The issue on appeal was whether appellant's allegations set forth
an individual or a derivative claim. 92 The court found that the
gravaman of count II was that the defendants had caused the
corporation to engage in an illegal scheme from which they could
personally benefit. 93 Todd argued that under Galler v. Gallere4 the
duty to properly manage the corporation's affairs was owed to her
individually because of her substantial but minority interest in the
closely held corporation. 95
The court conceded that the allegations of the counterclaim
properly set forth a cognizable claim of duty breached but refused
to extend Galler to the instant action for several reasons. First, the
court failed to find record proof that the corporation was closely
held even though that allegation was never disputed. 96 Second, as a
matter of pleading, the court found that the corporation was not

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 68-70, 506 N.E.2d 652.
Id. at 71, 506 N.E.2d at 652.
App. 3d 843, 501 N.E.2d 192 (1st Dist. 1986).
149 M11.
Id.at 847, 501 N.E.2d at 194.
Id.
Id.at 850, 501 N.E.2d at 196.
Id.
32 11.2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964).
Bio-Scientific, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 850-51, 501 N.E.2d at 196.
Id. at 850, 501 N.E.2d at 196.
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named as a party in any capacity in count II. 91 Third, the court
refused to use Galler's recognition of the rights of minority shareholders as a vehicle for converting a derivative action into an individual action. 9 Without further explanation, the court concluded that
the breaches alleged in the counterclaim could give rise to injuries
suffered by the corporation and its shareholders as a whole but not
as to any shareholder individually. Accordingly, the court affirmed
the dismissal of count II of the counterclaim.99

IV.

ATTORNEY'S FEES

The court decided two cases involving the issue of attorney's
° addressed the quesfees. Stanley v. Brassfield, Cowan & Howard'O
tion of the propriety of a fee award in a disqualification action.
Wencordic Enterprises, Inc. v. Berenson'0 1 addressed the issue of
whether the issuance of stock constituted a gift or collateral for
unpaid legal fees.
Stanley v. Brassfield, Cowan & Howard10 2 distinguished circumstances in which attorneys could and could not collect fees for
representing both a corporation and its directors in the-same action.
In 1984, minority shareholder Stanley sued Stanley Enterprises, Inc.,
its directors, and majority block of shareholders for monies owed
and an accounting.103 The law partnership of Brassfield, Cowan &
Howard was retained to represent both the corporation and the
individually named directors in that action. °4 Two years later, the
action was nonsuited on plaintiff's motion.10 5 Shortly thereafter,
plaintiff filed a second action against the partnership and the same
directors named in the prior action seeking reimbursement by either
set of parties for attorney's fees wrongfully paid in the first lawsuit
and the partnership's disqualification from further representation of
the corporation in the second suit.' °6 As to the first action, the trial
court found that the partnership's fees had been properly authorized

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 848, 501 N.E.2d at
Id. at 851, 501 N.E.2d at
Id. at 852, 501 N.E.2d at
152 I11. App. 3d 378, 504
158 Ill. App. 3d 913, 511
152 11. App. 3d 378, 504
Id. at 379, 504 N.E.2d at
Id.
Id.
Id.

194-95.
196.
197.
N.E.2d 542 (3d Dist. 1987).
N.E.2d 913 (2d Dist. 1987).
N.E.2d 542 (3d Dist. 1987) (Appeal denied).
543.
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and ratified by the corporation under the indemnification provisions
of The Business Corporation Act of 1983.107 The court further found
that the partnership could not continue to represent itself, the corporation and its directors in the second action. 08 The issue on appeal
was whether the partnership should have been disqualified from
representing the corporation, its shareholders and directors in the
past and pending actions and, if so, whether the award of attorney's
fees in the first action was proper. 01 9
Stanley argued that the same attorneys could not represent the
corporation, its shareholders and directors because of the inherent
conflict of interest existing between such parties in a derivative suit." '0
While not disputing the existence of such conflict in a derivative
action, the court found that the first action was brought against,
rather than on behalf of the corporation and, therefore, was not a
derivative action giving rise to the conflict."' Accordingly, the court
held that the partnership had not represented conflicting interests in
the first action and, therefore, the award of attorney's fees had been
proper." 2 The court found, however, that the second action was
derivative since it sought judgment on behalf of the corporation and
against the shareholders and directors and, therefore, the partner13
ship's continuing representation of all such parties was improper.
Wencordic Enterprises, Inc. v. Berenson"4 addressed problems
arising from an ambiguous pre-incorporation fee agreement. Attorney
Irving Berenson agreed to perform unspecified legal services regarding
the incorporation and development of a nursing home in exchange
for one share of the entity to be formed." 5 Pursuant to his retention,
from 1968-1981, Berenson formed a limited partnership, incorporated
its general partner, solicited investors, negotiated loans and procured
favorable administrative agency rulings." 6 Berenson also served as
director and secretary/treasurer of Wencordic Inc., the general partner of the limited partnership." 7 In 1968, Berenson received one

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32,
875(a)-(h) (1985).
Stanley, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 380, 504 N.E.2d at 544.
Id.
Id. at 380, 504 N.E.2d at 543.
Id.at 381, 504 N.E.2d at 544.
Id.
Id. at 380-81, 504 N.E.2d at 544.
158 111.App. 3d 913, 511 N.E.2d 907 (2d Dist. 1987).
Id.at 915-16, 511 N.E.2d at 908.
Id. at 916, 511 N.E.2d at 909.
Id.
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share of the limited partnership valued at $10,000 for his legal work.
In May of 1973, Berenson received forty shares of the nursing home's
stock which he assumed to be a gift."' Berenson believed, however,
that the value of his services exceeded both the value of his limited
partnership interest and the extent of the legal work he initially had
agreed to perform. 1 9 Accordingly, in June of 1973, Berenson allegedly submitted to Wencordic a bill for legal fees accruing from 1969
to 1973 in the amount of $13,000.120 Over the next eight years
Berenson received approximately $27,000 in dividends from his nursing home shareholdings.' 2 ' By 1981, Wencordic had fully remitted
Berenson's fees and requested the return of the forty shares of the
22
nursing home stock. Berenson refused.
The primary issue before the court was whether the forty shares
of stock were issued to Berenson as a gift or as collateral for his
unpaid legal fees. 2 3 The court placed the burden of proving donative
intent on Berenson who, as the corporation's attorney, director and
officer incurred the fiduciary duty of establishing the fairness of the
business transaction. 2 4 On one hand, the court found that the defendant lacked the benefit of corporate documentation to substantiate
his claim of donative intent.2 5 On the other hand, the court questioned why stock dividends would have been paid to Berenson if the
stock had been issued as a security interest. 126 Finding the evidence
to be "merely conflicting," the court affirmed the judgment of the
trial court that the stock had been issued as security for unpaid legal
27
fees. 1
V.

CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

The court was called upon to construe the terms "contingent
2
liability" in Climatrol Industries v. Fedders, Inc.1
and "net worth"
129
in Potter v. Potter .

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 917, 511 N.E.2d at
Id.
Id. at 916, 511 N.E.2d at
Id. at 917, 511 N.E.2d at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 919, 511 N.E.2d at
Id. at 919-20, 511 N.E.2d
Id. at 920, 511 N.E.2d at
149 I1. App. 3d 533, 501
160 11. App. 3d 444, 513

909.
909.
909.

911.
at 911.
912.
N.E.2d 292 (1st Dist. 1987).
N.E.2d at 423 (2d Dist. 1982).
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The first district interpreted the meaning of "contingent liability"
in a sales contract in Climatrol Industries v. Fedders, Inc.'30 Prior
to 1970, Climatrol was wholly owned by Worthington Corp. 3 1 In
1970, Worthington sold substantially all of Climatrol's assets to
Fedders, Inc. a2 Pursuant to the sales agreement, Fedders agreed to
assume Climatrol's "disclosed liabilities" as defined by the following
languages:' 33
For the purposes of this Agreement, the term 'Disclosed Liabilities'
as used herein 'means the aggregate of liabilities or obligations of
Corporations of any nature 'Whether accrued, absolute, contingent
or otherwise, which exist on the Closing Date and are * * * (iii)

those existing on the Latest Balance Sheet Date which are not
included or reserved for on such Latest Balance Sheet in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles and practices and
which are not required to be disclosed in this Agreement or the
Lists, Documents or Exhibits delivered hereunder * * * .14
In 1982, Worthington and Climatrol tendered to Fedders the defense
of four product liability suits involving accidents allegedly due to
products sold prior to 1970 but manufactured at a plant sold to
Fedders in 1970.'"1 Fedders rejected the tender of defense of all four
suits.

36

Climatrol and Worthington then sought a declaratory judg-

ment that Fedders was obligated under the sales agreement to assume
the defense of the four suits.'" Interpreting the sales agreement, the
trial court found that Fedders had not assumed responsibility for
any of these actions.
The issue on appeal revolved around the definition of "contingent liability." Climatrol and Worthington relied on an accounting
definition of contingency which provides:
In accounting a contingency is an existing condition, situation or
set of circumstances, involving a considerable degree of uncertainty,
which may, through a related future event, result in the acquisition
or loss of an asset, or the incurrence or avoidance of a liability,
usually with the concurrence of a gain or loss. A commitment which

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

149 Ill. App. 3d 533, 501
Id. at 534, 501 N.E.2d at
Id.
Id. at 534-35, 501 N.E.2d
Id. at 535, 501 N.E.2d at
Id.at 534, 501 N.E.2d at
Id.
Id.

N.E.2d 292 (1st Dist. 1987).
293.
at 293.
293-94.
293.
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is not dependent upon some significant intervening factor or decision
should not be described as a contingency. (Financial Accounting
18
Standards Board, Accounting Standards 88 (1973).).1

The plaintiffs interpreted this language to mean that any product
was a contingent liability once it was in existence and sold. 3 9 The
court rejected this interpretation of contingent liability as so broad
as to mean that Fedders had agreed to assume unlimited liabilities
rather than "specifically disclosed liabilities.' ' 40 Instead, the court
relied on the following distinction between a "contingency" and a
"contingent liability":
A contingent liability is one thing, a contingency the happening of
which may bring into existence a liability is another ... In the

former case there is a liability which will become absolute upon the
happening of a certain event. In the latter there is none until the
event happens. The difference is simply that which exists between
41
a conditional debt or liability and none at all.'
Pursuant to this distinction, the court found that Fedders had not
agreed to incur contingent liability for any products which, although
"in existence" at the time of the asset sale, had not yet caused
injury. 142 In essence, the court distinguished a contingent liability for
accounting purposes from a contingent liability for legal purposes by
requiring for the latter the actual accrual of a cause of action or the
pendency of a claim during the requisite time period. Since no cause
of action with respect to these four products had accrued by the
time the sales agreement was executed, the court affirmed the trial
43
court's judgment for Fedders.
The issue in Potter v. Potter'" concerned the interpretation of
an ambiguous valuation clause of a buy-sell agreement. Two brothers,
co-owners of a closely held corporation, entered into a buy-sell
agreement which provided that upon the death of either, the survivor
agreed to make a "satisfactory offer' ' 1 45 to purchase the decedent's
shares for an amount equal to the corporation's "net worth as shown

138.
139.
140.
141.
S.W.2d
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 535, 501 N.E.2d at 294.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 536, 501 N.E.2d at 294 (quoting Montgomery v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 49
967, 973 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) quoting Fernald v. Johnson, 71 Me. 437, 440 (1980)).
Id. at 537, 501 N.E.2d at 295.
Id.
160 Ill. App. 3d 444, 513 N.E.2d 423 (2d Dist. 1987).
Id.at 452, 513 N.E.2d at 428.
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on Federal income tax returns of the corporation for the fiscal year
preceding the decedent's death.' ' 46 Accordingly, upon the death of
his brother, defendant Kenneth Potter offered to purchase the decedent's shares for one-half of $54,086.95, the alleged net worth of
the corporation as set forth in the relevant 1980 federal income tax
return. 147
The decedent's executor posed several challenges to this figure,
the most significant of which were that Kenneth Potter himself had
recently listed the same property on the real estate market for
$275,000148 and that the 1980 federal income tax return did not
contain a line for net worth but did contain a line item which
contemplated asset depreciation. 49 Since the term "net worth" was
not defined in the agreement, and reference to the relevant tax return
was unavailing, the court found the valuation term to be ambiguous 50
and proceeded to construe the reasonable and probable intent of the
parties. The court consulted Black's Law Dictionary 5 ' which defines
"net worth" as the difference between the corporation's total assets
and total liabilities but does not contemplate asset depreciation. 5 2 In
light of both the "satisfactory offer" and "net worth" terms of the
agreement the court determined that the parties had intended to value
the corporation's property at its actual rather than its depreciated
"' Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's valuation
value. 53
of the corporation and remanded the case for further proceedings to
determine the corporation's net worth.
VI.

STANDING

Lower v. Lanark Mutual Fire Insurance Co. 51 4 raised troubling
questions about the power of an insurance company to divest a
complaining policyholder of standing to challenge fraudulent corporate activities. Brown v. Tenney " and Saddle Hills Community
Association v. Cavallari5 6 presented issues in which shareholders of

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.at
Id. at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.

447,
451,
454,
452,

513
513
513
513

N.E.2d
N.E.2d
N.E.2d
N.E.2d

at
at
at
at

424.
426.
429.
427.

542 (5th ed. 1983).
Potter, 160 I1. App. 3d at 452, 513 N.E.2d at 427.
Id. at 453, 513 N.E.2d at 428.
151 Ill. App. 3d 471, 502 N.E.2d 838 (2d Dist. 1986).
155 Ill. App. 3d 605, 508 N.E.2d 347 (1st Dist. 1987).
150 Ill. App. 3d 134, 501 N.E.2d 330 (2d Dist. 1986).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
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one corporation sought standing to challenge the actions of an
affiliate corporation. People ex rel. Hartigan v. Candy Club'57 posed
no issues of special concern but presented the court with an amusing
factual diversion.
In Lower v. Lanark Mutual Fire Insurance Co.' a former
multiple policyholder of Lanark insurance sought an accounting and
damages from Lanark for the fraudulent transfer of funds to and
by its secretary-treasurer Alma Dollinger from 1973-1987. Upon
discovering the misappropriation, Lanark's board investigated and
unanimously voted that the monies from 1978 be returned to Lanark
but to allow Dollinger to keep the monies taken prior to 1978.19
This resolution, and the agreements and arrangements subsequent
thereto, were objected to by president Lower and his wife, plaintiff
Mary Jean Lower.160 Thereafter, the plaintiff filed this derivative
action. 6' In retaliation for the suit, Lanark cancelled Lower's one
remaining policy but the cancellation was rescinded by the Illinois
Department of Insurance. 162 When the same policy expired in Decem-

ber of 1982, Lanark refused to renew

it.163

Lanark and six of its

nine directors filed motions to dismiss contending that Lower lacked
standing to maintain the derivative action because she was no longer
a Lanark policyholder. 64 The trial court agreed with the defendants
and dismissed the action.
The sole issue raised on appeal was whether the trial court erred
in its determination that the plaintiff lacked standing to maintain the
derivative action because she was not a policyholder throughout the
pendency of the suit. 65 While not disputing this requirement, the
plaintiff attempted to characterize the termination of her policyholder
status as involuntary, analogous to situations where shareholders lost
their shares due to freeze-outs or forced mergers. 66 The court disagreed with this analogy, finding that although the termination was

157. 149 Ill. App. 3d 498, 501 N.E.2d
158. 151 I11.App. 3d 471, 502 N.E.2d
159. Id. at 473, 502 N.E.2d at 839.
160. Lower v. Lanark Mut. Fire Ins.
942 (2d Dist. 1983).
161. Lower v. Lanark Mut. Fire Ins.
839-40 (2d Dist. 1986).
162. Id. at 474, 502 N.E.2d at 840.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 473, 502 N.E.2d at 840.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 474, 502 N.E.2d at 840.

188 (1st Dist. 1986).
838 (2d Dist. 1986).
Co., 114 Ill. App. 3d 462, 463, 448 N.E.2d 940,
Co., 151 Ill. App. 3d 471, 473, 502 N.E.2d 838,
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not voluntary from plaintiff's point of view, "neither was it 'involuntary' so as to reach the status of a involuntary freeze or merger
67
so as to justify departure from the rule.'
The Lower opinion raises more questions than it resolves. For
example, why was this case resolved under federal rather than Illinois
law? The Seventh Circuit case of Portnoy v. Kawecki Beryko
Industries'61 construe Federal Rule of Civil Proceedure 23.1 as requiring contemporaneous ownership of stock not only at the time of
the action complained of but through out the pendency of the suit
as well.169 Section 7.80 of The Business Corporation Act, however,
requires share ownership only at the time of the disputed action. 70
Presumably, had this case been resolved under Illinois rather than
federal law, the plaintiff would have won since she could have
established policyholder status at the relevant time, i.e., at the time
of the disputed action.
A second issue which was not satisfactorily resolved by the court
is whether an insured policyholder who had standing at the inception
of the litigation can be divested of that standing by the insurance
company's unilateral act of refusing to renew her policy. The Lower
court may have been correct in refusing to accept the plaintiff's
involuntary merger and freeze-out analogy under federal law, but in
so doing it empowered mutual insurance companies to eliminate
derivative actions by the simple expedient of refusing to renew the
complainant's policy under Illinois law. It is questionable whether
such result comports with the equitable principles governing derivative
actions generally or the requirements of section 7.80 specifically.
These issues could have been resolved by ordinary statutory construction and should have been based on Illinois rather than federal law.
Standing to file a double derivative action under section 7.80 of
The Business Corporation Act' 7' arose as a matter of first instance
in the case of Brown v. Tenney. 172 In 1987, defendant Tenney and
plaintiff Brown formed Pioneer Corporation with each owning 48.501o
of its stock. 7 1 In 1982, Pioneer's shareholders formed T/B Holding
Co. to act as Pioneer's parent. 74 The shareholders exchanged their

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
607 F.2d 765, 766 (7th Cir. 1979).
Lower, 151 Ill.
App. 3d at 473, 502 N.E.2d at 840 (citing Portnoy, 607 F.2d at 767).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32,
780 (1985).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32,
1.01-17.05 (1985).
155 I1. App. 3d 605, 508 N.E.2d 347 (1st Dist. 1987).
Id.at 606, 508 N.E.2d at 348.
Id.
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Pioneer stock for an equal percentage of the T/B stock. "5 In 1983,
Brown filed this action, individually and derivatively, charging Tenney with "a course of conduct that was wasting, diverting, and
damaging the assets of Pioneer and T/B."' 7 6 The issue on appeal
was whether Brown had standing to bring the double derivative
177
action on behalf of both T/B and Pioneer.
Although there was no dispute that as one of its shareholders
Brown had standing to bring a derivative action on behalf of T/B,
Tenney contended that under the contemporaneous ownership requirement of section 7.80178 Brown was not a shareholder of Pioneer
and therefore lacked standing to bring a derivative action on its
79

behalf. 1

The court defined a double derivative action as:
[O]ne in which a shareholder of a parent or holding corporation
seeks to enforce derivatively the corporation's derivative right to
sue on behalf of the subsidiary ....

Stated differently, the share-

holder is effectively maintaining the derivative action on behalf of
the subsidiary, based upon the fact that the parent or holding
corporation has derivative rights to the cause of action possessed
by the subsidiary ....

Generally, this type of action arises where,

as in this case, a parent corporation owns and controls a subsidiary
.... The wrong sought to be remedied by the complaining share-

holder is not only that done directly to the parent corporation in
which he or she owns stock but also the wrong done to the
corporation's subsidiaries which indirectly, not actually, affects the
parent corporation and its stockholders.1 0
The court recognized the split of authority respecting the propriety
of double derivative actions. Cases disallowing such actions cited
strict adherence to the contemporaneous ownership rule which requires the plaintiff to be a shareholder of the corporation on whose
behalf he is suing at the time of the disputed transaction. 8' Finding

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 607, 508 N.E.2d at 349.
178. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32,
7.80 (1985).
179. Brown, 155 Ill.
App. 3d at 607, 508 N.E.2d at 349.
180. Id. at 607-08, 508 N.E.2d at 349 (citations omitted).
181. Id. (citing Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 410, 219 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1985));
Sheehan v. Municipal Light & Power Co., 54 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Busch v. Mary
A. Riddle Co. of Del., 283 F. 443 (D. Del. 1922); Sabre v. United Traction & Elec. Co., 225
F. 601 (D. R.I. 1915)).
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such authorities to be "rigid and outmoded,"'' 1 2 the court chose
instead to adopt the more progressive trend which permits double
derivative actions under such theories as: the right of a subsidiary
to seek specific performance of the parent's duty to redress injuries
to the subsidiary;' 83 the subsidiary's shareholders third party right to
compel the parent to enforce the subsidiary's rights; 184 the duty of
one corporation to redress wrongs to another corporation where both
corporations are controlled by the same individuals;8 5 and, situations
where a double derivative action may be analogous to piercing the
corporate veil. 8 6 Without further discussion of which of these theories
applied to the instant case, the court found that since the prerequisites
to bringing a single derivative action on behalf of the subsidiary had
been satisfied under section 7.80, that the plaintiff also had standing
to bring the double derivative action against the parent. 8 7
8 8 the secIn Saddle Hills Community Association v. Cavallari,
ond district affirmed a trial court ruling that membership in one
corporation did not give standing to challenge the internal procedures
of an affiliate corporation. Defendant Samuel Cavallari was a member of Saddle Hills Community Association, Inc., an association of
homeowners of property located within the Saddle Hills Estate subdivision. 8 9 The subdivision was owned by Saddle Hills Farms, Inc.,
which had created an architectural review committee to approve
improvements on property located within the subdivision. 90
In September of 1983, Cavallari constructed a chain link fence
on his property located within the subdivision. 9' Plaintiff Gatewood,
as president of the subdivision and sole member of the architectural
review committee, sought and received an injunction ordering removal
of the fence because of Cavallari's failure to receive prior committee

182. Id. at 609, 508 N.E.2d at 350.
183. Id. (citing Note, Suits by a Shareholder in a Parent Corporation to Redress Injuries
to the Subsidiary, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1313-14 (1951); 13 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
CORPORATIONS § 5977, at 207 (perm. ed. 1984)).
184. Id. (citing Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944)).
185. Id. (citing United States Lines, Inc. v. United States Lines Co., 96 F.2d 148 (2d Cir.
1944)).
186. Id. (citing Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 54 F. Supp. 588 (W.D. Pa.
1944)).
187. Id. at 610, 508 N.E.2d at 351.
188. 150 Il.App. 3d 134, 501 N.E.2d 330 (2d Dist. 1986).
189. Id. at 138, 501 N.E.2d at 333.
190. Id. at 135, 501 N.E.2d at 331.
191. Id.

HeinOnline -- 12 S. Ill. U. L.J. 828 1987-1988

19881

Corporations

approval for its construction. 192 Cavallari claimed that as a member
of the Saddle Hills Community Association, Inc. he had standing to
challenge plaintiff's self-appointment to the review committee. 93 The
second district disagreed, finding that Cavallari's membership in the
subdivision's association did not give him standing to challenge the
procedures of the corporate owner of the subdivision. 94 Accordingly,
the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.
It is interesting that both the trial and appellate courts framed
the issue in this case as whether the shareholder of one corporation
had standing to sue an affiliate corporation. The court's denial of
standing to Cavallari suggests the erroneous principle of law that
only a corporation's own shareholders can challenge its internal
procedures and acts. Apparently, both courts confused the concept
of ultra vires with the well established right of third parties to
challenge corporate procedures that directly injure them. Generally,
the question of whether a corporation has exceeded its lawful powers
can be raised only by one interested in the corporation or by the
state. 95 Members of homeowner's associations, however, have always
been afforded standing to challenge procedures of a corporate developer if the member's proprietary rights are being infringed. 196 Both
Cavallari courts failed to distinguish a suit challenging the existence
of a corporate power from a suit challenging the manner in which
that power was exercised. Cavallari was not questioning whether
Saddle Hills Farm, Inc. had the power to appoint an architectural
review committee. Rather, he was challenging the procedure by which
that power was exercised-Gatewood's self-appointment to the review
committee. Under this doctrine, Cavallari should have had standing
to sue the corporate owner of the subdivision. Notwithstanding the
court's erroneous standing analysis, the result probably would not
have been different since Cavallari had constructive notice of the
restrictive covenants and failed to comply with known procedures.
People ex rel. Hartigan v. Candy Club'97 is perhaps more notable
for its facts than its legal analysis. The Illinois Attorney General
sued the estate of decedent Sidney Finzelbar who in life had incorporated and operated as a not-for-profit corporation an X-rated

192.
193.
194.
195.

196.
197.

Id.
Id. at 138, 501 N.E.2d at 333.
Id. at 135, 501 N.E.2d at 331.
157.8 (1983).
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32,
Wolinsky v. Kadison, 114 11. App. 3d 527, 449 N.E.2d 151 (1st Dist. 1983).
149 I1. App. 3d 498, 501 N.E.2d 188 (1st Dist. 1986).
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dance and nude fashion show known as the Candy Club. 19 The
complaint alleged that between 1978 and 1984, the Candy Club
fraudulently violated its not-for-profit charter' 99 by collecting entrance
fees in excess of $200,000 and that Finzelbar, as manager and
operator of the club, had converted such fees to his own use.2°° The
State sought the club's dissolution and liquidation, and the distri20 1
bution of its assets to charity or to the state.
The defendant challenged the standing of the Attorney General
to bring the action. The Attorney General defended its standing
under the liquidation provisions of the General Not For Profit
Corporation Act 202 which empowers the Attorney General to involuntarily dissolve a not-for-profit corporation if it lacks bona fide
membership and engages in ultra vires activities. 203 The court found
that the complaint contained the requisite allegations of fraud and
abuse of authority to empower the Attorney General to bring the
action and, accordingly, reversed the trial court's dismissal of the

complaint

204

VII.

DISSOLUTION

The capacity of a corporation to be subject to post-dissolution
criminal proceedings arose in People v. Boyce205 and to post-dissolution civil proceedings in de St. Aubin v. Johnson.2°6 Thomas v.
Borgsmiller, Inc. 20 7 considered the propriety of damage remedies
available to a creditor who failed to receive notice of a corporation's
dissolution.
The movement to hold corporations criminally accountable suffered a setback in the case of People v. Boyce °8 which overturned
a corporation's conviction for violations of the Illinois Environmental
Protection Act.20 9 On April 11, 1984, the Attorney General filed an
indictment charging the defendant corporation with criminal deposit

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 499, 501 N.E.2d at 189.
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, 163a49 (1983).
Candy Club, 149 111.App. 3d at 500, 501 N.E.2d at 189.
Id.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32,
163a49, 163a54 (1983).
Candy Club, 149 I11.App. 3d at 503, 501 N.E.2d at 191.
Id.
156 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 509 N.E.2d 776 (2d Dist. 1986).
151 Ill. App. 3d 184, 502 N.E.2d 360 (5th Dist. 1986).
155 I11.App. 3d 1057, 508 N.E.2d 1235 (5th Dist. 1987).
156 I11.App. 3d 1036, 509 N.E.2d 776 (2d Dist. 1986).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111,
1044(b)(1), (d)(l)(a) (1983).
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and use of hazardous waste.210 That indictment was subsequently nolprossed. 21' On August 1, 1985, the Illinois Secretary of State involuntarily dissolved the same corporation for failing to file its annual
report and pay franchise taxes. 21 2 On August 13, 1985, the Attorney
General filed a new indictment against the corporation again charging
criminal deposit and use of hazardous waste. 2 3 The second indictment
resulted in the corporation's conviction. 214 On appeal, the corporation
challenged the authority of the state to prosecute the second indict25
ment since it was filed after the corporation's dissolution.
Under Illinois law the dissolution of a corporation is analogous
to the death of a person: 216 once existence is terminated, the corporation, like the deceased, loses its capacity to sue or be sued and all
pending proceedings to which the corporation is a party are abated. 21 7
In an effort to save the indictment, the Attorney General argued
that the prosecution was authorized under two provisions of The
Business Corporation Act: section 12.80211 which provides for survival

of remedies after dissolution, and section 12.30(c)(5), 2 9 which provides for survival of proceedings pending on the date of dissolution. 220
The court rejected the section 12.80 argument as contravening a well
established Illinois Supreme Court ruling which limited that provision
to civil actions only. 22 1 The court rejected the section 12.30 argument
by finding that the indictment was filed twelve days after dissolution
and, therefore, was not pending as of the date of dissolution.2 22 The
court admonished the State that the only way this prosecution could
have been saved was to have proceeded under the April 1984 predissolution indictment. 223 Having failed to do so, the court concluded
that the second indictment was untimely and the prosecution there-

210. Id.; Boyce, 156 II1. App. 3d at 1039, 509 N.E.2d at 778.
211. Boyce, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 1039, 509 N.E.2d at 778.
212. Id.
213. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111,
1044(b), (d)(1)(a) (1983).
214. Boyce, 156 I11. App. 3d at 1039, 509 N.E.2d at 778.
215. Id.
216. Id. (citing People v. Mazzone, 74 Ill. 2d 44, 48, 383 N.E.2d 947, 950 (1978)).
217. Id. (citing Blankenship v. Demmler Mfg. Co., 89 Ill. App. 3d 569, 572, 411 N.E.2d
1153, 1155 (1st Dist. 1980)).
218. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32,
12.80 (1985).
219. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32,
12.30(c)(5) (1985).
220. Boyce, 156 I11. App. 3d at 1040, 509 N.E.2d at 778-79.
221. Id. at 1041, 509 N.E.2d at 779 (citing People v. Mazzone, 74 Ill. 2d 44, 383 N.E.2d
947 (1978)).
222. Id. at 1042, 509 N.E.2d at 779.
223. Id. at 1044, 509 N.E.2d at 782.
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under improper.224 Accordingly, the corporation's conviction was

reversed

225

A contrary result was reached in de St. Aubin v. Johnson 26 in
which the fifth district determined the capacity of a dissolved Wisconsin corporation to be sued after the expiration of the applicable
limitations period. Plaintiff Victor de St. Aubin was a former shareholder and creditor of Burlingshire, Inc., an unprofitable Wisconsin
corporation. 227 In an effort to improve profitability, Burlingshire's
shareholders entered into a plan to convert the corporation into a
limited partnership. 22 The plan required the dissolution of the corporation which, under Wisconsin law, could be accomplished only
"when all debts, liabilities and obligations of the corporation had
been paid and discharged, or adequate provision . . . made therefore. ' ' 229 De St. Aubin objected to this plan and after it was implemented refused to participate in the limited partnership or have any
of his liabilities assumed by it.230 Three years later, he sued the
general partner and the former directors and shareholders of Burlingshire for monies allegedly owed to him pursuant to the conversion
plan. 23 1 The court found the action to be "time-barred" under section
180.787 of the Wisconsin Business Corporation Law which provides
that "[t]he dissolution of a corporation shall not take away or impair
any remedy available to or against such corporation, its directors,
officers, or shareholders, for any right or claim existing or any
liability incurred, prior to such dissolution if . . . commenced within
2 years after the date of such dissolution. ' 23 2 As each of de St.
Aubin's claims arose more than two years prior to the filing of the
complaint, the court concluded that the claims were barred and,
233
hence, affirmed the trial court's decision.
The de St. Aubin analysis is marred by some interesting ironies.
The court construed section 180.787 of the Wisconsin Business Corporation Law as a statute of limitations barring the litigation of de
St. Aubin's untimely claims. Section 180.787, however, is not a

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id.
Id.
151
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1045, 509 N.E.2d at 782.
M1!.App. 3d 184, 502
at 185-86, 502 N.E.2d
at 186-87, 502 N.E.2d
at 186-89, 502 N.E.2d
at 186-87, 502 N.E.2d
at 187, 502 N.E.2d at
at 189, 502 N.E.2d at
at 189-90, 502 N.E.2d

N.E.2d 360 (5th Dist. 1986).
at 362.
at 363.
at 363-65 (citing Wis. STAT. § 180.765 (1976)).
at 362-63.
363.
365 (citing Wis. STAT. § 180.787 (1976)).
at 365.
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statute of limitations which abates the right to relief. Rather it is a
statutorily imposed period during which the dissolved corporation's
life is extended for the limited purpose of resolving creditor's claims.
It is interesting to note that de St. Aubin is cited copiously in
West's Wisconsin Annotated Statutes for the apparent reason that it
is one of the few appellate cases in the United States to construe the
1980 Model Business Corporation Act provisions dealing with shareholder liability for the debts of a dissolved corporation. 23 4 One of
the other rare cases to construe these provisions was the Wisconsin
Supreme Court case of Bazan v. Kux Machine Company,235 which

relied heavily on the construction of a similar Illinois provision. 23 6
The Bazan court first decided that the statutory law of the state of
incorporation, Illinois, should govern the question of whether the
life of a corporation could be prolonged for litigation purposes.23 7
The Bazan court then looked to Illinois' section 157.94, which was
based on the same Model Business Act section 105 as Wisconsin's
section 180.787, and concluded that these provisions were statutorily
imposed periods extending the time during which the dissolved corporation retained the capacity to sue and be sued rather than limitations periods barring the right to relief. 238 Ironically, the de St.
Aubin court failed to acknowledge the Bazan ruling and in so doing
failed to apply Wisconsin's own precedential analysis to the limitations issue. Since Bazan's analysis is weakened by the fact that it
dealt with an Illinois rather than a Wisconsin corporation, the
definitive construction of Wisconsin's section 180.787 is now de St.
Aubin.
The case of Thomas v. Borgsmiller, Inc.23 9 addressed the issue

of the proper measure of damages when a director and sole shareholder of a corporation fails to notify creditors of the corporation's
dissolution. The parties had entered into a ten year lease agreement. 240
The defendant corporation fell into financial distress, assigned the

234. See Model Business Corp. Act § 105 (1980).
235. 52 Wis. 2d 325, 190 N.W.2d 521 (1971).
236. Bazan involved an action by an injured worker against a dissolved Illinois corporation
which was held not to be time-barred by the two-year provision for filing suits by or against
a dissolved corporation. The Bazan decision cited to O'Neill v. Continental Ill. Co., 341 Il.
App. 119, 93 N.E.2d 160 (1950) which construed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, 157.94 (1949).
237. Bazan, 52 Wis. 2d at 334, 190 N.W.2d at 525.
238. Id. at 337-38, 190 N.W.2d at 526. See O'Neill, 341 Il1. App. 119, 93 N.E.2d 160.
239. 155 Il. App. 3d 1057, 508 N.E.2d 1235 (5th Dist. 1987).
240. Id. at 1059, 508 N.E.2d at 1237.
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lease to another corporation and voluntarily dissolved. 24' The assignee
defaulted on the lease payments and subsequently declared bankruptcy. 242 The plaintiff sued the assignor corporation seeking damages
in the amount of its lease indebtedness to him.2 43 The trial court
found the defendant corporation personally liable on the remaining
lease indebtedness. 2 The appellate court reversed.
As a threshold matter, the court rejected the argument that a
novation had occurred between the defendant and its assignee which
legally bound the plaintiff to look solely to the assignee for satisfaction of the lease indebtedness.2 4 The court next determined whether
the defendant's failure to give the plaintiff notice of dissolution
rendered him personally liable for the corporate debt pursuant to
section 42-6 of The Business Corporation Act which provides:
Notice of intent to dissolve. The directors of a corporation which
fails to mail to a known creditor of such corporation, as provided
in this Act, a notice of the filing by the Secretary of State of a
statement of intent of such corporation to dissolve, shall be jointly
and severally liable to such creditor for all loss and damage occa2 46
sioned thereby.
Plaintiff argued that a prima facie case for personal liability of
a director is established once it is proven that the corporation failed
247
to give a known creditor notice of the corporation's dissolution;
thereafter, the burden shifts to the director to disprove the wrongful
distribution of corporate assets by the dissolved corporation. 248 The
court accepted the first contention but rejected the second finding
that the burden remained on the plaintiff to prove the existence of
corporate assets at the time of dissolution and the wrongful distribution of such assets to non-creditors. 249 Once liability is established,
damages are to be measured by the value of the assets wrongfully
distributed not, as plaintiff argued, by the amount of indebtedness

241. Id.
242. Id.at 1060, 508 N.E.2d at 1237.
243. Id. at 1060, 1065, 508 N.E.2d at 1237, 1240.
244. Id.at 1059, 508 N.E.2d at 1236.
245. Id.at 1060, 1063, 508 N.E.2d 1237, 1239.
246. Id. at 1064, 508 N.E.2d at 1240 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32,
157.42-6 (1983)).
247. Id.at 1065, 508 N.E.2d at 1240.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1065, 508 N.E.2d at 1241 (citing Swager v. Couri, 77 I11.2d 173, 191-92, 395
N.E.2d 921, 928-29 (1979); State Bank v. Segovia, 49 II. App. 3d 682, 364 N.E.2d 688 (2d
Dist. 1977)).
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to the creditor. 2 0 Having failed to prove either the existence of
corporate assets at the time of dissolution or any harm caused by
their wrongful distribution, the court reversed the judgment in favor
of the plaintiff and remanded the case for a new trial on the issue
251
of the defendant's personal liability.

VIII.

SECURITIES

The court decided three securities cases of interest. Miller v.
Smith 252 addressed the definition of a stock nominee in a struggle to
gain control over a closely held corporation. Schuler v. Beers2 " reevaluated the purchaser's recision remedy in light of recent amendments to the 1953 Illinois Securities Law. Saunders, Lewis and Ray
v. Evans254 examined the passive investor exception to the registration

requirements of the 1953 Act.
The central issue in Miller v. Smith2 55 was the rightful ownership
of a control block of stock. Plaintiff, Smith III, argued that he had
purchased 100 shares of stock in the Call Publishing Company from
the deceased Emma Weinberg, who had been an employee of the
company at the time she acquired the stock but had never acquired the
stock certificates, had never paid any consideration for the stock,
and had never claimed an ownership interest in the stock. 2 6 Defendants, trustees for the estate of Smith, Jr., argued that Weinberg
really had been a nominee for Smith, Jr., a founding member of the
company and the original payor of the stock. The court agreed with
the defendants.

25 7

Citing Hanley v. Hanley,218 the court implicitly found that the
circumstances of Weinberg's shareholdership amounted to a resulting
trust. 2 9 Under the Hanley case, a resulting trust arises when it is

proven by evidence that is clear, convincing and unmistakable, 2 60

250. Id. (citing Swager v. Couri, 77 111.2d 173, 192, 395 N.E.2d 921, 928-29 (1979)).
251. Id. at 1066, 508 N.E.2d at 1241.
252. 157 I11.App. 3d 486, 510 N.E.2d 427 (5th Dist. 1987).
253. 157 Ill. App. 3d 97, 510 N.E.2d 48 (5th Dist. 1987).
254. 158 Ill. App. 3d 994, 512 N.E.2d 59 (4th Dist. 1987).
255. 157 Ill. App. 3d 486, 510 N.E.2d 427 (5th Dist. 1987).
256. Id. at 488-89, 510 N.E.2d at 428.
257. Id. at 489, 510 N.E.2d at 429.
258. 14 I11.
2d 566, 152 N.E.2d 879 (1958).
259. Miller, 157 Il. App. 3d at 489, 510 N.E.2d at 429.
260. Hanley, 14 Ill. 2d 566, 572, 152 N.E.2d 879, 883 (1958); Scanlon v. Scanlon, 6 I11.
2d 224, 127 N.E.2d 435 (1955); Tuntland v. Haugen, 399 Ill. 595, 78 N.E.2d 308 (1948); Cook
v. Blazis, 365 I11.625, 7 N.E.2d 291 (1937).
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"and usually comes into existence where one person furnishes the
consideration . . . for the purchase of the property while the title is

taken in the name of another." ' 26' It is unclear that Miller satisfies
the first part of this test since the court's opinion was based on
insufficient and conflicting evidence rather than "clear, convincing
and unmistakable" evidence.2 62 Nonetheless, as there was no dispute
that Smith, Jr. put up the original consideration for the stock, and
that Weinberg's estate disclaimed any interest in the stock ownership,
the court concluded that the estate of Smith, Jr. was the rightful
owner of the stock. 263 As a result of the court's holding, 199 shares
were allocated to Smith, Jr.'s estate and one share was allocated to
Smith III.26

The court in Schuler v. Beers265 found that the 1983 amendments
to the Illinois Securities Law of 1953266 eliminated the purchaser's
right to rescind securities transactions which failed to meet the act's
reporting requirements.2 67 The plaintiff allegedly purchased stock
based on material misrepresentations and omissions and, accordingly,
sought recission of the sale under the 1953 act.2 6 Analyzing the act,
its amendments, and its legislative history, the court found that
rescission was an "exceedingly harsh'' 269 remedy for failure to comply
with the act's ministerial
report was not available
affect -a buyer's decision
of the 1983 amendments

reporting requirement, especially since the
to the public 270 and, therefore, could not
to purchase. 271 The interpretive comments
supported this analysis, stating:

Section 4.G. is intended to aid small businesses by allowing
them to raise capital on a limited basis without incurring the sizeable
costs incident to registering a public securities offering. Many small
businesses raise needed capital in an informal manner without
benefit of counsel. Under section 4.G. prior to amendment, innocent
defects in filing have had harsh and inequitable consequences.
To benefit small businesses, this exemption as amended has

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Hanley, 14 111.2d at 571-72, 152 N.E.2d at 882.
Id. at 572, 152 N.E.2d at 883.
Miller, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 490-91, 510 N.E.2d at 428-29.
Id. at 491, 510 N.E.2d at 430.
157 11. App. 3d 97, 510 N.E.2d 48 (5th Dist. 1987) (this case has been settled).
137.1-137.19 (1983).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2,
137.4(g) (1981).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2,
137.1-137.19 (1983).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2,
Schuler, 157 11. App. 3d at 101, 510 N.E.2d at 50.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, 1 137.4(g)(4) (1983).
Schuler, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 101, 510 N.E.2d at 50.
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been designed to be available whether or not an issuer is aware of
the report requirement. Under old section 4.G., a purchaser had a
right to rescind a securities purchase for up to three years from the
date of sale if the seller, despite full compliance with other provisions
of Sec. 4(G) and without any fraud or misrepresentation, merely
failed to file a report. The unnecessarily harsh consequences and
arbitrary operation of the report filing requirement have been
repealed to insure greater equity in the application of the Act and
272
to eliminate what was a classic trap for the unwary.
In light of these comments, the court found that the 1983 amendments
effectively eliminated the purchaser's right to recision where the issuer
merely had failed to meet the reporting requirements of the 1953
27 3
Act.
The "managerial" or "passive investor" exception to the registration requirements of the Illinois Securities Law of 1953274 were
examined in Saunders, Lewis & Ray v. Evans.275 The plaintiff corporation charged the defendant law firm with failing to register and
report a securities transaction which involved the transfer of a
substantial interest in the corporation. 276 The defendant argued that
the transaction at issue was not a security as defined by S.E.C. v.
Howey Co. 277 since the purchaser was a corporate director capable
of influencing corporate activities rather than a "passive investor"
incapable of exercising control over his investment. 27 The court
agreed with the defendant. The purpose of the reporting requirement,
the court explained, was to protect innocent investors from relying
on misrepresentations and omissions of material information, 279 not
to protect members of corporate management who have access to
20
Implicit
reportable information prior to making their investments.
in the court's analysis is the assumption that the purchaser could not
have been damaged by material omissions since as a corporate
manager he had access to such information and the capacity to
exercise control over his investment. The securities fraud elements

272. Id. at 102-03, 510 N.E.2d at 50-51 (citing ILL. ANN.
(Smith-Hurd 1983) (interpretive comment)).
273. Id. at 103-05, 510 N.E.2d at 51-52.
274. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, 1 137.5 (1979).
275. 158 Ill. App. 3d 994, 512 N.E.2d 59 (4th Dist. 1987).
276. Id.
277. 328 U.S. 293 (1946) ("passive investor" test).
278. Saunders, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 995, 512 N.E.2d at 61.
279. Id. at 996, 512 N.E.2d at 61.
280. Id. at 996, 512 N.E.2d at 62.

STAT.

ch. 121 1/2,
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implicated in this approach are reliance and causation: a high ranking
corporate insider would have knowledge of information material to
his investment and, therefore, could not be damaged by its nondisclosure to the public.
There are two problems with this approach. First, the purchaser
in this case was not a corporate insider or manager prior to making
the disputed investment. Rather, he acquired his managerial status
in the corporation after he acquired its stock. The opinion disregards
this fact. Instead, it assumes the purchaser both controlled his
investment and had access to material information before the investment was made. Second, the court need not have reached the reliance
issue since the crux of its analysis was that the purchaser, as a
corporate manager, was not a passive investor entitled to the protection of the Securities Law. That approach suggests that the plaintiff's
securities fraud case failed not because the purchaser failed to rely
on nondisclosed information, but because no duty was owed to the
purchaser qua corporate manager.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Many of the 1987-1988 Corporations survey cases demonstrate
the Illinois Appellate Court's ability to construe legislative enactments
in accordance with emerging trends. Other cases, however, indicate
the unwillingness of the Illinois judiciary to properly apply precedent
or to utilize available legal devices to arrive at appropriate and
creative solutions to the problems confronting them.
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